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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ON THE
INTERNET: DETERMINING THE LIABILITY OF
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
Jennifer L. Kostyu
A "digital revolution" has enveloped the United States and other
countries around the world, bringing with it radical changes to modes of
communication and potentially drastic alterations to existing legal prin-
ciples.' In less than twenty years, the number of computers linked to
form the Internet grew exponentially from less than 300 in 1981 to cur-
rent estimates of more than 9.4 million host computers! One commenta-
tor stated in 1997 that an estimated total of 21.3 million people are on-
line users in the one hundred countries that have Internet access and the
154 countries that use electronic mail.'
'J.D. Candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See William J. Cook, Be Wary of Internet Casting Shadows on Copyright Holders,
CHI. LAW., Apr. 1996, 60, 60 (quoting Vice President Gore's description of the Internet's
enormous and speedy growth as "a revolution-the digital revolution"). "Revolution" is
defined as "a complete or radical change of any kind" and "revolutionize" means "to
make a complete and basic change in; alter drastically or radically." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1150 (3d ed. 1996).
2. See Richard S. Vermut, File Caching on the Internet: Technical Infringement or
Safeguard for Efficient Network Operation? 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 275 (1997) (arguing
that the Internet is the form of computer telecommunications that has seen the most
growth and development). Host computers, also known as web servers, refer to comput-
ers that store and relay information for use on the Internet. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 849-50 (1997) (describing the Internet and its swift development and expansion in the
United States and internationally) [hereinafter Reno II]; see also Joseph Levi, Will On-
Line Service Provider Liability Unravel the Web? in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND
LITIGATION 1996, at 547, 550 n.1 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 477, 1997) (noting that information is available on the Inter-
net through hosts using special software designed for Internet servers). The continuous
use of certain software that enables the host computer to retrieve and transmit requested
web documents from the host's hard drive through an open and permanent connection to
the Internet distinguishes web servers from other computers. See Vermut, supra, at 288.
One commentator reported in 1995 that the Internet doubled in size each year from 1988
through 1994. See Christopher Anderson, The Accidental Superhighway, THE ECONOMIST,
July 1, 1995, at 1 (discussing the unexpected growth and development of the Internet).
3. See Vermut, supra note 2, at 275 (noting the pace at which the Internet has been
developing since the early 1980s). Electronic mail (e-mail) is correspondence similar to a
letter or memorandum sent via the Internet, or within an intra-organization network (an
Intranet), between two or more people. See Ian C. Ballon, The Emerging Law of the
Internet, in 18TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW, at 1163, 1171 (PLI Pats.,
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The Internet has become a medium for the worldwide distribution of
information, inexpensively expanding the reach of businesses, multime-
dia, and individuals to global proportions.' The distinct roles of printer,
publisher, and distributor combine into a single entity due to advances in
technology and communications Authors or other creators of original
works benefit from the Internet through the quick distribution of their
works to consumers and additional markets, without any loss in the
quality of the reproduction.6
This informational freedom is not without drawbacks. Creators of
original works face a greater risk of violation of their intellectual prop-
erty rights because of the ease with which their copyrighted material may
be used in an unauthorized manner compared to publishing through tra-
ditional mediums.' Owners of copyrighted material have sought redress
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 507, 1998) (de-
fining e-mail and other terms associated with the Internet). Those that are able to use e-
mail may not have the ability to access information that is posted on web sites by others on
the Internet, even though their correspondence may be sent through the interconnected
network of computers that forms the Internet. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing the compo-
sition of the Internet).
4. See Levi, supra note 2, at 549-50 (discussing the quick development of, and the
benefits reaped from, the wide reach of the Internet). Businesses, individuals, trade asso-
ciations, government entities, educational institutions, and others use the Internet to dis-
seminate information. See id.; see also Jose I. Rojas, Liability of ISPs, Content Providers
and End-Users on the Internet, in 18TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW, supra
note 3, at 1009, 1011 (listing the types of content that have been made available through
the tnternet by written word, graphics, and sound).
5. See Joan Gilsdorf, Comment, Copyright Liability of On-Line Service Providers,
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 619, 619 (1998) (discussing the effect technology has had on the ability
to disseminate information); see also INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7-8 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (discussing the integration of
existing separate communications networks into one system); infra Part II.B (providing an
in-depth discussion of the White Paper). Networks consisting of fiber optic cables, wires,
switches, routers, microwave frequencies, and satellites link telephones, computers, and
fax machines together to send and receive information. See WHITE PAPER, supra, at 7-8.
6. See Mary Ann Shulman, Comment, Internet Copyright Infringement Liability: Is
an Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a Dance Hall Operator? 27 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 555, 557-58 (1997) (discussing the impact of digital technology and the
Internet on authors and their intellectual property rights).
7. See Levi, supra note 2, at 550 (explaining potential problems copyright owners
face by utilizing the Internet). Unlike the traditional print medium, "high-speed, high-
capacity electronic information systems ... make it possible for an individual to deliver
perfect copies of original works of authorship in digital form to scores of other individuals
with just a few keystrokes." Patrick J. Glynn, Cyber Copyrights: Internet Provider Liabil-
ity, 60 TEx. B. J. 634, 635 (1997) (describing the potential impact of copyright infringe-
ment through the use of electronic information systems such as the Internet).
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for infringing acts occurring through the Internet from various entities.8
For example, copyright owners have pursued claims against Internet sub-
scribers who misused the material, and the Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") 9 that provided those subscribers with Internet access. 1°
The Copyright Act of 19761 grants authors and creators the ability to
copyright their material so that they may benefit economically by holding
the exclusive right to sell their work. 2 When the designated material is
used by another without the permission of the copyright owner, the
copyright owner may seek equitable and statutory remedies, including
injunctive relief." Through the efforts of Congress and the courts, copy-
right law is fairly comprehensive in addressing traditional communica-
8. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (adjudicating a claim of copyright infringement
against the operator of a computer bulletin board service and the Internet Service Pro-
vider on whose network the alleged infringement took place).
9. See Rojas, supra note 4, at 1016-17. There are three general types of ISPs: (1)
On-line Service Providers (e.g., America On-Line, Prodigy, and Compuserve), which pro-
vide Internet access and their own proprietary or "closed system" on which subscribers
can access special content-based data services; (2) Internet Access Providers (e.g., Netcom
and UUNet), which provide Internet access only; and (3) Logical Access Providers, or
search engines, (e.g., Lycos, Infoseek, Yahoo, and Altavista), which provide search serv-
ices on the Internet. See id.
10. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365; see also Rojas, supra note 4, at 1016 (reasoning
that because of the available technology and nature of the Internet, users of infringing ma-
terial do not have a substantial monetary investment in their actions, encouraging copy-
right owners to hold others with "deep pockets" accountable for the infringements).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 11996) (granting exclusive rights to copyright
owners). Theoretically, an economic incentive persuades individuals to create more origi-
nal works, which in turn benefits society through the increased availability of new ideas,
concepts, and information. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985) (discussing the intent of copyright laws). When the Copyright Act was re-
vised in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives stated:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider... two questions: First, how
much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and,
second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The
granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers
a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-30 n.10 (1984) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)).
13. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504. Courts have the power to grant temporary and final
injunctions against the use of the copyrighted material to prevent or restrain the infringing
behavior. See id. § 502(a). In addition, a court may award the copyright owner actual
damages or statutory damages. See id. § 504(b), (c) (providing attorney fees and the prof-
its received from the infringement). A copyright infringer also may be criminally prose-
cuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2319 if he or she willfully violated copyright law with the purpose
of receiving commercial advantage or private financial gain. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a).
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tions tools. 14
The Internet, however, is a non-traditional communication medium
only recently scrutinized for infringements of existing copyright law.'5
Courts have attempted to fit the Internet into existing communications
categories, often yielding inconsistent results. 16 When addressing the li-
ability of ISPs for infringements by their subscribers, courts have applied
different standards of review 7 and altered the traditional elements of li-
ability.'8 The confusion stemming from inconsistent application of theo-
ries of liability to infringement on the Internet leaves copyright owners,
Internet users, and ISPs with little direction as to what behavior is ac-
tionable under existing copyright law.' 9
The parties involved in this controversy desired a resolution in order to
conduct their personal and corporate business in the manner that would
14. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 23-45 (discussing the subject matter
and scope of protection provided by existing copyright laws). The Copyright Act specifi-
cally enumerates eight categories of protected subject matter: "(1) literary works; (2) mu-
sical works.. . ; (3) dramatic works ... ; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pic-
torial, graphic and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Congress intended
section 102 to be illustrative and not inclusive, "set[ting] out the general area of copy-
rightable subject matter, but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or out-
moded concepts of the scope of particular categories." WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 42
n.123 (quoting H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666).
15. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CYBERSPACE: TOWARDS A NEW CONSENSUS (1996), avail-
able in 1996 WL 710185, at *5 (stating that only a small amount of case law exists ad-
dressing copyright infringement in the context of the Internet due to its relatively new use)
[hereinafter ITAA DOCUMENT].
16. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 560. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explain-
ing that an ISP is not completely analogous to a common carrier because ISPs provide
more services to their subscribers than common carriers do to their users; and, ISPs are
not natural monopolies required to treat all customers indifferently as common carriers
do); Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding
that an ISP was not liable for defamatory statements posted through its network when the
ISP did not have knowledge of the content and was merely a distributor of material);
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1795, 1797,
1.799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding that an ISP was a publisher, and therefore liable for de-
famatory statements posted by third parties on the ISP's network).
17. Compare Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369, 1372-73 (refusing to apply a strict liability
standard to an ISP when one of its subscribers was directly liable for copyright infringe-
ment), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(applying a strict liability standard in order to find a bulletin board system operator di-
rectly liable for copyright violations of a subscriber).
18. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (adding the element of volition or causation to
the traditional strict liability standard of copyright law).
19. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 560.
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best protect their interests. The federal government accepted the chal-
lenge of mediating between the two conflicting interests at the heart of
this debate: the protection of the exclusive rights of copyright owners
under existing copyright law, and the free flow of information that makes
the Internet such a valuable tool. Unless these interests are properly
balanced, the results could have detrimental consequences on copyright
owners and the Internet. 2' For instance, if copyright owners' material is
consistently infringed upon, they could refuse to make original works
22
available on-line. On the other hand, imposing liability on ISPs for the
behavior of their subscribers may hinder the full potential of the Internet
as a resource. 3 To date, efforts taken by the three branches of the fed-
eral government include: President Clinton's creation of a task force in-
vestigating and recommending a resolution to this conflict; judicial
weighing of these competing interests in the course of litigation; and con-
gressional proposals to amend existing copyright law.24 Congress at-
tempted to clarify an ISP's copyright liability in each legislative proposal,
and eventually passed the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limi-
tation Act ("OCILLA" or the "Act").
25
This Comment examines the developing law governing copyright in-
fringement liability of ISPs. First, Part I explains the current status of
20. See Levi, supra note 2, at 550 (arguing that the high risk of having copyrighted
material used without authorization may inhibit authors from using the Internet, which
will inevitably decrease the value and continued growth of the Internet); infra Part II
(outlining the actions taken by the judiciary, President Clinton, and the legislature to ad-
dress ISP liability for copyright infringement).
21. See Levi, supra note 2, at 550; ITAA DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at *1 (reflecting
on the possible consequences on the development of the Internet if copyright owners are
not given adequate protection for their material).
22. See Levi, supra note 2, at 549-50 (cautioning authors about the risk of copyright
infringement liability).
23. See ITAA DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at *1 (stating that "copyright protection
measures which result in singling out Internet access providers, and legislative proposals
which attach liability unfairly to access providers, will undoubtedly undermine the delivery
infrastructure, forcing these companies from the marketplace and making access to the
Internet more difficult").
24. See infra Part II (discussing the government's actions in the context of copyright
infringement on the Internet).
25. See S. 2037, 105th Cong. §§ 201-05 (1998) (proposing the Internet Copyright In-
fringement Liability Clarification Act of 1998); H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act); see also infra Parts II.C and IV.B (explaining the provisions and potential
effectiveness of the new legislation). Generally, the amendments provide for the exemp-
tion of ISPs from the traditional strict liability standard that governs copyright infringe-
ment. ISPs are not exempt, however, from all liability which is determined on a case-by-
case basis. See generally infra Part II.C (discussing the recently enacted Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act).
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copyright law and the Internet. Part II then discusses the steps the vari-
ous governmental entities have taken to resolve the issue of ISP liability.
Part III in turn analyzes whether the efforts by the government have
been successful. Finally, Part IV critiques the legislative efforts by Con-
gress and concludes that the OCILLA effectively clarifies how copyright
laws should apply to ISPs.
I. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE INTERNET
A. The Current Status of Copyright Law
A comprehensive understanding of ISP liability requires familiarity
with some of the complexities of copyright law. In the United States,
copyright law began with the Framers of the Constitution, who intended
the granting of copyrights to promote free expression.26 Congress took
the power granted by the Constitution,27 and with the enactment of the
first copyright law in 1790, started determining the boundaries of copy-
right protection." Copyright law, which falls strictly within the province
of the federal government, covers "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
26. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 539, 558
(1985) (noting, in a suit regarding the unauthorized publication of quotes by a magazine
from President Ford's memoirs, that the framers provided copyright owners with copy-
right and the first right of publication to serve as "the engine of free expression"); see also
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that even
though economic gain in return for labor is the immediate aim of copyright law, the ulti-
mate goal is to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good"). The ability to
copyright material creates a right to market individual expression, which in turn creates a
private economic motivation to conceive and disseminate new ideas publicly. See id. The
ability to copyright original works is also of significant value to the economy. See Glynn,
supra note 7, at 635 (discussing the findings of the White Paper). Glynn notes that "the
core copyright industries grew twice as fast as the U.S. economy as a whole between 1991
and 1993 and generated an employment growth rate four times that of the economy as a
whole between 1988 and 1993." Id.
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
28. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 562 (summarizing the development of intellectual
property protection, and copyright law in particular); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that the Constitution gives Con-
gress the task of defining the scope of copyright protection and balancing it with the inter-
est of public access).
In 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention unanimously agreed to
grant to Congress the power enumerated in Article I of the Constitution, and ratified the
clause in its present form in 1788. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 19 n.31 (recounting
the legislative history of the enactment of Article I of the U.S. Constitution). Two years
later, George Washington signed the first copyright law. See id.
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which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device., 29 Presently, there
are three types of liability for copyright infringement: direct liability, vi-
carious liability, and contributory liability.30
1. Direct Copyright Liability
The Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright owners a limited period of
time to exercise five exclusive ownership rights regarding original mate-
rial.3 These rights consist of the exclusive right to reproduce, create de-
rivative works, distribute, display, and publicly perform the copyrighted
material.32 Invasion of these rights constitutes direct infringement which
may be claimed regardless of the lack of intent or knowledge of the in-
fringing party.33 This means that innocent or accidental infringement
may constitute an actionable offense. Establishing a prima facie case of
direct copyright infringement requires proof of (1) ownership by the
plaintiff of a valid copyright in the infringed work,35 and (2) the defen-
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The copyright laws do not extend to "any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id.
§ 102(b).
30. See Karen S. Frank, Cable Online Liability, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW, at 773,
783-85 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No.
509, 1998) (reviewing the theories of copyright liability).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994) (defining ownership of a copyright as the author's
life, plus 50 years). The length of ownership of works produced and copyrighted before
January 1, 1978 is defined in different terms. See id. §§ 303-04.
32. See id. § 106.
33. See id. § 501; see also Shulman, supra note 6, at 565 (discussing the legal elements
of a direct infringement cause of action). Congress provided a description of non-
infringing uses of copyrighted material and statutory limitations as listed in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-
18. The provisions limiting a copyright owner's exclusive rights include general "fair use"
of the material. See id. § 107. Specific exemptions include: use of the material by libraries,
use of the material before its first commercial sale, use of the material by nonprofit institu-
tions in teaching activities, and the retransmission of the material by cable and satellite
operators if a statutory licensing fee is paid. See id. § 107-08.
34. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 565.
35. See id. (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla.
1993)). It is implicit in the copyright ownership requirement that the material is eligible
for copyright protection. See id. In other words, the material must be original, creative,
and fixed in a tangible medium of expression to qualify for protection. See WHITE PAPER,
supra note 5, at 24 (examining how courts have derived these requirements from the
Copyright Act). Originality arises from the independent creation of a work, and only
needs to demonstrate a "modicum" of creativity. See id. at 24-25. Copyright protection
attaches when the material is "fixed," or "when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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dant's copying of the material." Under the existing copyright laws, copy-
right owners may seek a variety of equitable and monetary remedies for
direct infringement of their exclusive rights.37
2. Vicarious Copyright Liability
The second type of copyright infringement claim exists under the doc-
trine of vicarious liability: culpability arises from the benefits garnered
from infringement and the ability to control the infringing activity, even
though a third party actually copied the material.38 While the Copyright
Act specifically prohibits direct infringement, the judicial imposition of
vicarious liability has its genesis in the common law theory of respondeat
superior. 9 A finding of vicarious liability requires proof that the defen-
dant had the right and ability to control the acts of the primary infringer
and received a direct financial benefit from the infringement. n Courts
36. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 565 (citing Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556 (holding
that a bulletin board operator was directly liable for the infringing conduct of a sub-
scriber)). If direct proof of copying is not available, the plaintiff may offer indirect proof
by showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted material, and that the defen-
dant's work was materially similar to that of the plaintiff's. See Kouf v. Walt Disney Pic-
tures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1044 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that in order to prove
copying of a screenplay, the plaintiff had to show that the alleged infringer, the defendant,
had access to the screenplay and that the works were substantially similar).
37. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-05. Remedies available to the copyright owner include an
injunction to prevent further violation, see id. § 502, impoundment and destruction of all
infringing works, see id. § 503, statutory damages, actual damages and profits, see id. § 504,
and costs and attorneys' fees, see id. § 505.
38. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d
Cir. 1963) (concluding that a store owner who retained supervision of and received a share
of the profits received from the sale of bootleg records was liable for copyright infringe-
ment).
39. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining the development of vicarious copyright liability in the courts); see also Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 307 (applying the theory of respondeat superior to vicarious
copyright infringement); Polygam Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314,
1328 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing factors courts rely on in determining whether a defendant
satisfies the "control" prong of the test for vicarious liability); Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed
Publ'g Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623, 1626-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no vicarious li-
ability where the defendant did not financially benefit from the infringement or have con-
trol of the actions of the infringer).
The maxim "respondeat superior," literally defined as "let the master answer,"
means that the master, employer, or principal is liable for the actions of his or her servant,
employee, or agent done within the scope of employment and authority. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990). For a more in-depth discussion regarding vi-
carious liability, see JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS Ch. 17 (4th ed. 1971).
40. See Frank, supra note 30 at 784 (citing the elements of vicarious liability found in
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.); see, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 307-08 (allowing
the imposition of vicarious liability on the employer for the acts of the employee after
1244 [Vol. 48:1237
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often consider the ability of the defendant to police the use of infringing
material in finding vicarious liability.4'
3. Contributory Copyright Liability
The third type of claim for copyright infringement may be brought un-
der the doctrine of contributory liability. 2 Under contributory liability, a
defendant may be held accountable for the infringing behavior of a third
party when the defendant did not directly engage in the copying of copy-
righted material." Like vicarious liability, the doctrine of contributory
liability is not expressly addressed in the Copyright Act, and it originated
from common law torts doctrine." Courts have imposed liability for con-
tributory copyright infringement when the defendant "induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, 45 and knows
46
or should have known of the infringing activity. Participation by the
alleged contributory infringer may include personal conduct, providing
analogizing the circumstances to that of the proprietor-performer of a dance hall); see also
infra note 41 (discussing two differing rationales for analyzing vicarious copyright liabil-
ity).
41. See Frank, supra note 30, at 785 (noting that ISPs have tried to analogize their
situation to the cases concerning landlords, inferring that they too have little control over
the users of their facilities). Decisions in many of the cases regarding copyright infringe-
ment revolve around landlord/tenant relationships and dance hall owner/performer rela-
tionships. See id. at 784-85. Landlords are usually not held liable if the landlord had no
notice of the impending infringement, rented the space at a fixed rate (thereby not directly
profiting from the infringement), and did not supervise the tenant in any way. See id.
Conversely, dance hall operators and other establishments offering entertainment are fre-
quently found vicariously liable because they can police the material to be performed and
their profits directly correlate to the performance. See id. at 785. For example, in
Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929),
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a monetary award consisting of dam-
ages and attorneys' fees against the owner of a dance hall that did not direct or consent to
the selection of music played by the orchestra hired by the dance hall.
42. See Frank, supra note 30, at 783 (listing the theories of liability for copyright in-
fringement).
43. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
44. See id. at 435 (stating that contributory infringement is expressly set out in the
Patent Act and analogizing contributory infringement of copyrights to that of patent in-
fringement); R. Carter Kirkwood, Comment, When Should Computer Owners Be Liable
for Copyright Infringement by Users? 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 709, 721 (1997) (citing Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
45. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted) (explaining that participation and knowledge of
infringing activities constitute contributory liability).
46. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (explaining that "contributory infringement is merely a
species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold
one individual accountable for the actions of another").
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materials, or supplying equipment that aids in infringement. 7 In Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.," the Supreme Court
held that the scope of contributory liability did not automatically include
sellers of copying equipment and like material capable of "substantial
noninfringing uses., 49 The Court reasoned that holding duplication ma-
terial and equipment manufacturers contributorily liable for the acts of
the users would "block the wheels of commerce."5 °
B. Tracing the Development of the Internet
1. The Historical Origins of the Internet
The Internet was not originally intended to be a commercial communi-
cations tool for the general public. It was launched in 1969 under the
name ARPANET (Advanced Research Project Agency Network), an
international experiment consisting of interconnected computers and
networks, designed to share defense-related research and data between
the military, defense contractors, and universities. 1 After the 1962 Cu-
ban missile crisis, the once remote possibility of a future nuclear attack
loomed closer and government officials realized that the centralized U.S.
telecommunications system would not withstand such an attack. As a
result, the government began developing a decentralized and self-
maintained network which theoretically could not be destroyed in a nu-
clear assault;53 consequently, centralized control of the network was
47. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 571 (discussing the elements and boundaries of con-
tributory infringement).
48. 464 U.S. at 417.
49. Id. at 442 (explaining the balance between "a copyright holder's legitimate de-
mand for effective... protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely
to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce").
50. Id. at 441. Because the intent of the framers of the Constitution in creating copy-
right protection was to benefit society by the distribution of new ideas, a ruling such as this
would effectively stop the use of copying technology. Cf. supra notes 26-28 and accompa-
nying text (illustrating the intent of the framers of the Constitution that copyrights are to
be protected for the benefit of the public in the creation and dissemination of new ideas).
51. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997) (documenting the origins and
development of the Internet). ARPANET consisted of a network of redundant computer
channels through which communication could be maintained, even if parts of the network
were damaged as the result of war. See id.
52. See Robert Craig Waters, An Internet Primer for Florida Legal Researchers, FLA.
B.J., Nov. 1996, at 12, 15-16 (discussing the history and reasons for the development of
ARPANET).
53. See Vermut, supra note 2, at 280-81 (discussing the need for overlapping routes in
the development of this early communications network).
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never implemented. 4
At its inception, because ARPANET consisted of only four linked
supercomputers, it was too minute of a network to be used effectively for
military communications.5 To increase the size and use of ARPANET,
the government gave researchers and private companies more opportu-
nity to use it, and personal messages became the substance of network
traffic.56 The arrival of inexpensive personal computers and networking
devices in the 1980s brought a flood of new users into the network, effec-
57tively halting the use of ARPANET solely for government purposes.
While ARPANET officially dissolved in 1990, what had become the
Internet kept expanding, and continues to do so today.
2. The Internet as It Presently Exists
The Internet expanded from a few supercomputers in 1969 to an esti-
mated forty million Internet users in 1996.' 9 By 1999, that number was
expected to grow to 200 million users, sixty percent of whom live in the
United States.6° Approximately 100,000 new messages are posted on the
Internet every day.61 Contrary to popular belief, the Internet is not one
54. See Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 624 (stating that one consequence of having no cen-
tralized control of the Internet is that any network has the ability to be a part of the Inter-
net).
55. See id. at 624 n.45. Even though the Internet had a modest beginning, it has
grown to the point that the overall structure and operation of the Internet is not affected
by the presence or absence of any one device, material, or entity. See Vermut, supra note
2, at 281 (referring to the lack of dependency on any one computer or network as "one of
the most important concepts" of the Internet).
56. See Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 624-25 n.45 (explaining that the private sector's high
use of the Internet contributed to the government's discontinuing its use of the Internet).
57. See id.
58. See id.; see generally ITAA DOCUMENT, supra note 15, (reviewing the evolution
and status of the Internet from a historical, legislative, and technical perspective).
59. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). The District Court made compre-
hensive findings of fact based on parties' stipulations and the evidence received in open
court describing the character and dimensions of the Internet. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 830 n.9, 842 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter Reno
fl.
60. See Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 850. Access to the Internet may be achieved in many
ways. See Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 832. One may use a computer that is physically and di-
rectly connected to a computer network that is linked to the Internet, or one can use a
modem to dial over telephone lines into a network that is linked to the Internet. See id.
This physical access is provided by a variety of sources including educational institutions,
such as colleges and universities; businesses; "free-nets," which are networks established
by individual communities; libraries; Internet caf6s; and ISPs. See id. at 832-34.
61. See Reno H, 521 U.S. at 851. Once the Internet is accessed, there are six general
methods of communication. See Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 834-36. One method is one-to-
one messaging, such as e-mail where a message is sent to the address of another. See id. at
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computer system on which all of the available information is kept and ac-
cessed universally-it is many individual networks interconnected like a
62
web. In order to access the Internet, a user must travel through one of
these networks (via ISP), after which the user can retrieve information
stored on other networks connected to the Internet.63
The Internet is a very attractive communications and information tool.
The Internet's attractiveness flows from four factors: the inexpensiveness
of Internet service, 64 the technological ease with which one may locate
information on the Internet,65 the high volume of information and serv-
ices available on the Internet,66 and the ability of individuals to post in-
834. A second method is one-to-many messaging, such as "listservs" which is the elec-
tronic equivalent of subscribing to a mailing list. See id. A third method consists of dis-
tributed message databases, which allow users to access various databases on particular
subjects without having to subscribe to a list. See id. at 834-35. A fourth method, termed
real time communication, transmits dialog immediately back and forth between users like
a normal conversation. See id. at 835. A fifth option is real time remote computer utiliza-
tion, which gives access to the computer databases at a specific facility, such as a library's
on-line card catalog program. See id. Lastly, users can communicate by remote informa-
tion retrieval, where users search for information on the Internet and then retrieve that
material. See id.
62. See Reno H, 521 U.S. at 849 (describing the Internet as an "international network
of interconnected computers"). All information posted on the Internet is identified by a
unique address, or Uniform Resource Locator (URL). See Levi, supra note 2, at 560 &
n.30 (explaining how a subscriber traverses and finds information on the Internet). Each
document resides on a specific host computer, whether that computer belongs to an ISP or
an individual with the necessary software. See id. at 549-50 & n.1. One well-known Inter-
net service, the World Wide Web (WWW), is not a database of information but a service
based on a basic type of language (or a hypertext-based information protocol) that allows
Internet users to access the information on the Internet. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment,
New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement:
A Solution in Search of a Problem? 38 IDEA 335, 336 n.4 (1998) (describing the World
Wide Web and a Web page as methods of grouping available information on the Internet).
63. See generally Reno 1I, 521 U.S. at 850-53 (naming many ways an Internet user can
access information on the Internet). Access to the Internet may be achieved in many
ways, but all involve going through a network that is permanently and directly linked to
the Internet, usually an ISP. See id.; see also supra note 9 (listing the types of ISPs).
64. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 9, 12 (discussing the Internet's economic incen-
tives); cf. Cahoy, supra note 62, at 348-49 & n.80 (noting that many ISPs now charge sub-
scribers fixed rates instead of a certain fee calculated by the time spent on the Internet).
65. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the continual development of soft-
ware and equipment makes the Internet increasingly easier to use). Cf. Wendy M. Me-
lone, Note, Contributory Liability for Access Providers: Solving the Conundrum Digitali-
zation Has Placed on Copyright Laws, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 491,493 n.9 (1997) (noting that
digitalization of data has made the handling of information develop in new and different
ways).
66. See Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 851 (describing different communication methods on the
Internet); see also Shulman, supra note 6, at 558 n.16 (describing how Internet users access
and download information from a BBS).
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formation on the Internet without significant difficulties.67 When
amending the Communications Act of 1934, Congress found that the
Internet provided diverse educational, informational, cultural, and politi-
cal benefits to society.68 At the same time, these attributes stretch the
69
territorial boundaries of copyright law.
67. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 557 n.10. Web pages, which are single locations on
the WWW with given addresses, can be established by anyone with a personal computer,
appropriate software, and a modem. See id. All types of material, including text, pictures,
and audio recordings are easily placed on a web page for minimal production and adver-
tising costs. See id.
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (1994). The findings by Congress that justify protective
action are as follows:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in
the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens. (2)
These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that
they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as
technology develops. (3) The Internet and other interactive computer services
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. (4) The
Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit
of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation. (5) Increasingly
Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational,
cultural, and entertainment services.
Id.
69. See Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 631-36 (comparing the view points of ISPs and copy-
right owners as to the amount of liability that should be imposed on ISPs for copyright in-
fringement). Because the applicability of existing copyright laws to ISPs is not clear, ISPs
have maintained that they may be exempt from liability under section 111(a)(3) of Copy-
right Act. See id. at 632. This passive-carrier exemption states:
The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a performance
or display of a work is not an infringement of copyright if . . . the secondary
transmission is made by any carrier who has no direct or indirect control over the
content or selection of the primary transmission or over the particular recipients
of the secondary transmission, and whose activities with respect to the secondary
transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other communications
channels for the use of others.
17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (1994).
Copyright owners argue that ISPs are not passive carriers of information and are
in a position to control copyright infringement because ISPs can implement guidelines and
warnings about infringement, use tools to monitor their networks, and swiftly stop the in-
fringing activities on their networks. See Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 634-35 (comparing the
arguments of copyright owners to those of ISPs).
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II. GOVERNMENT APPROACHES TO THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET
SERVICE PROVIDERS FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. The Courts' Response to Claims of Copyright Infringement
The judiciary faced the challenge of interpreting existing statutory and
common law liability in the context of claims of copyright infringement
over the Internet. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, and
thus, the only available precedent is lower court decisions which vary by
jurisdiction.
1. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena° is an early decision that offers some
direction regarding copyright infringement liability of ISPs." In Playboy,
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found
a bulletin board system ("BBS")72 operator directly liable for the copy-
right infringement of a subscriber." A subscriber to the BBS uploaded
(i.e., created copies of) photographs from Playboy magazines and posted
these images on the bulletin board.74 The BBS operator, Frena, only be-
came aware of the use of copyrighted pictures when he received a sum-
mons from Playboy.75 Subsequently, he removed the photographs from
the bulletin board and instituted a monitoring process to prevent similar
pictures from being uploaded.76
The court found that Frena violated Playboy's exclusive right to dis-
play, and distribute publicly, its copyrighted material by furnishing the
bulletin board where the material was posted.77 The court held that al-
though Frena did not actually copy or upload the photographs on to the
70. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
71. See Marilyn C. Maloney, Intellectual Property in Cyberspace, 53 Bus. LAW. 225,
236 (1997) (identifying Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena as one of the initial decisions re-
garding the liability of ISPs for copyright infringement).
72. See Cahoy, supra note 62, at 336 nn.6-7 (describing what constitutes a BBS and
how one works). A BBS is an electronic forum for message and file exchange, which may
be maintained by an ISP through its own computer system, or an individual that accesses
the Internet through the services of an ISP. See id.
73. See Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
74. See id. at 1554.
75. See id.
76. See id. The court's decision did not specify whether Frena instituted a techno-
logical monitoring process or if he checked the bulletin board himself at various intervals.
See id.
77. See id. at 1556 (using strict liability to demonstrate Frena's violation of copyright
law).
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bulletin board, his lack of awareness and intent regarding the posting of
the photographs was irrelevant in a claim for direct copyright infringe-
ment.79 Despite Playboy, other courts have arrived at different conclu-
sions with regard to an ISP's liability for copyright infringement.
2. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia
Shortly after the decision in Playboy, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California faced a similar case in Sega Enter-
prises Ltd. v. Maphia.8° In this case, a BBS operator solicited BBS sub-
scribers to upload copies of Sega video games, and then allowed other
subscribers to download the games to their personal computers for a
fee.8" The case came before the district court in 1994 when Sega learned
of the infringing acts.82 In this first proceeding, the court held that Sega
established a prima facie case of direct and contributory copyright in-
fringement, and issued a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction against the BBS operator.8' According to the court, the opera-
tor's lack of knowledge of the specific times when the games were up-
loaded and downloaded was irrelevant given the operator's knowledge of
the games and his direct solicitation of subscribers.84
When the case appeared before the district court three years later, al-
though the court did not hold the BBS operator liable for direct copy-
right infringement," the court granted summary judgment for contribu-
tory infringement and issued a permanent injunction against the
78. See id. at 1556.
79. See id. at 1559 (supporting a finding of direct copyright infringement). Playboy
legally owned the copyrights to the photographs, and they were displayed on Frena's bul-
letin board; innocence would only be relevant to the amount of monetary damages to be
awarded. See id.; see also Rojas, supra note 4, at 1020-21 (analyzing the holding of Play-
boy with regard to an ISP's liability for copyright infringement); supra Part L.A (discussing
the elements of copyright infringement).
80. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Sega II].
81. See id. at 928-29. The BBS operator sold video game copiers to subscribers that
downloaded the Sega video games, which were necessary to operate the games. See id. at
929. The operator also knew that those who offered the games for downloading accepted
"donations" for free downloads. See id.
82. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter
Sega fl.
83. See id. at 687, 689.
84. See id. at 686-87 (finding the BBS operators liable for contributory copyright in-
fringement).
85. See Sega 11, 948 F. Supp. at 931-32. The court's holding that the operator was not
liable for direct infringement was based on the decision in Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., discussed infra at Part II.A.3. See id. at
932.
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operator.s6 The court found the operator contributorily liable, primarily
because the operator did not deny he had knowledge of the infringing
conduct, and had actively participated in it.87 As a result, the court only
examined how substantial the operator's contribution was to the in-
fringement."
3. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc.
The most encompassing case to date covering the potential copyright
infringement liability of ISPs is Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Inc.9 The action arose from a series
of postings that Denis Erlich, a former minister of the Church of Scien-
tology, made criticizing the church, and allegedly using materials copy-
righted by the church.90 Representatives of the church, the Religious
Technology Center ("RTC"), requested that Erlich, the operator of the
BBS, and Netcom, the ISP through which the BBS gained access to the
Internet, remove the infringing material. The requests were denied9
2
and RTC filed an action against Erlich, the BBS operator, and Netcom
for copyright infringement. 93 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California concurrently ruled on Netcom's motion
for summary judgment, the BBS operator's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and RTC's motion for a preliminary injunction.94
86. See id. at 941 (granting Sega's motion for summary judgement by holding the
BBS operator contributorily liable for copyright infringement).
87. See id. at 933.
88. See id. Contributory infringement was established because the BBS subscribers
directly infringed on Sega's copyright, and the operator had induced, caused, and materi-
ally contributed to the infringing action. Id. at 932-33.
89. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California also decided Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia, discussed
supra Part II.A.2.
90. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
91. See id. at 1366.
92. See id. The BBS operator asked RTC to prove that the church owned the copy-
rights for the material in question, and RTC dismissed this as an unreasonable request.
See id. Netcom refused to remove the material, claiming it would require termination of
all other uses of the BBS service. See id.; see also Maloney, supra note 71, at 236-37
(commenting on the Netcom decision).
93. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1366. The Church also claimed Erlich was liable for
misappropriation of trade secrets, but did not make this claim against the other parties.
See id. at 1366 n.5. The district court heard preliminary motions, after which Netcom and
RTC settled out of court. See Frank, supra note 30, at 787-88 (describing the events that
occurred after the court ruled on preliminary motions).
94. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1366. The court partially granted and partially de-
nied Netcom's summary judgment motion and a motion by the BBS operator. See id. The
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RTC alleged that Netcom and the BBS operator were liable for direct,
contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement.5 The court held that
Netcom could not be a direct copyright infringer as a matter of law,96 and
distinguished the holding of the district court in Playboy.97 The court
stated that storage and transmission of information is a necessary action
for a working network system and the incidental copying that occurs
automatically and uniformly in that process does not constitute "copy-
ing" as defined by statute. The court also reasoned that the imposition
of strict liability on an ISP would have unreasonable consequences, re-
sulting in liability of every server that transmits infringing material when
the ISP is no more than a conduit for the information." The court stated
that there should be "some element of volition or causation" by the ISP,
an element in which Netcom's system lacked because a third party had
used the network to create a copy of the church's material.'O
The court also dismissed RTC's claim that Netcom was vicariously li-
able for copyright infringement.'0 ' The court applied the two-prong test
advocated in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,' 2 questioning
whether Netcom had the right and ability to control the conduct of its
subscribers, and whether Netcom received direct financial benefit from
the infringing activities.03 The Netcom court held that questions of tech-
court denied RTC's motion for a preliminary injunction. See id.
95. See id. at 1367. The distinction between a BBS operator and an ISP is insignifi-
cant for the purpose of this paper. Both entities provide a form of Internet service, and a
BBS must go through an ISP for access to the Internet. Any discussion of the liability of
ISPs therefore includes BBS services and operators, even if not directly mentioned.
96. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73.
97. See id. at 1370. The court indicated that the Playboy court only looked at the li-
ability for infringing on the exclusive right to publicly distribute copies, regardless of
whether Frena made the copies of the infringing material. -See id.
98. See id. at 1368-69. The court likened the position of an ISP as a copier to that of a
copy machine owner who makes the machine available to the public. See id. at 1369. The
court did not doubt that copies of the material were created by Netcom. See id. at 1368.
The court, deciding whether copies were made, relied on MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), which held that copying occurs when
data is loaded from a storage service into a computer's Random Access Memory (RAM),
where it stays long enough for it to be discerned by the computer. See Netcom, 907 F.
Supp. at 1368. The court then distinguished MAI Systems on the ground that Netcom's
copying was incidental instead of being affirmatively initiated by the ISP. See id.
99. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369, 1372.
100. Id. at 1370.
101. See id. at 1377.
102. 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating that a defendant is liable if it can control
the actions of the infringer and benefits financially from the infringement).
103. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text
(discussing the two-prong test for vicarious liability for copyright infringement). Knowl-
edge is not an element of vicarious copyright infringement. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at
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nological and industry protocols created concern about an ISP's right and
ability to control a subscriber's conduct.'O With regard to receiving a di-
rect financial benefit, the court determined that Netcom did not receive
extra monies from the infringing activities because Netcom provided
service on a fixed fee, unrelated to content accessed or time spent on the
Internet."''
Although the court held that Netcom was not a direct or vicarious
copyright infringer, the court found that it could face liability for con-
tributory infringement"'0 The court asked two questions, the answers to
which indicated whether Netcom was contributorily liable.0 7 First, did
Netcom have knowledge of the infringing activity? °8 The court found
that issues of fact existed as to Netcom's knowledge of the infringing
conduct because the letter from RTC requesting the removal of the
copyrighted work could constitute notice of the infringement."'" Second,
if Netcom knew of the infringement, was its participation substantial?" °
The court reasoned that allowing public distribution of infringing mate-
rial and not preventing further damage could equate to substantial par-
ticipation, making Netcom's participation in the infringement a factual
issue."'
Netcom and RTC entered into a settlement agreement,'1 2 therefore,
1375.
104. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376.
105. See id. at 1377.
106. See id. at 1372-73, 1375, 1377. Because the court ruled on a motion for summary
judgment, which requires judgment only on matters of law, not material fact, the court did
not have to answer conclusively whether Netcom was contributorily negligent. See id. at
1366, 1375.
107. See id. at 1373-75.
108. See id. at 1373.
109. See id. at 1374-75. The court did not address the requisite level of knowledge re-
quired for a finding of contributory liability, but did indicate that unlike a landlord-tenant
relationship, Netcom retained control over the system, and the relevant time frame of
knowledge would be when Netcom provided services to the direct infringer, not the BBS
operator. See id. at 1373-74; see also supra note 41 (discussing the use of the landlord-
tenant relationship as a comparable situation to that of an ISP).
110. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (following the rationale in Gershwin Publ'g
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971)).
111. See id. The court held that an ISP does not completely relinquish control over its
network and can therefore be responsible for its use and for taking measures to protect
copyrighted material. See id.
112. See Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 648 (recounting the August 1996 settlement agree-
ment between Netcom and RTC). Subsequently, Netcom introduced new terms and con-
ditions for subscribers of Netcom: complainants must substantiate infringement claims
with some sort of proof of infringement; the subscriber posting the allegedly infringing ma-
terial may respond; and Netcom will temporarily and possibly permanently deny access to
the material pending an internal investigation. See Frank, supra note 30, at 788.
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neither an appeals court nor the Supreme Court will review this decision.
Courts ruling subsequent to the Netcom decision, however, have fol-
lowed the Netcom court's analysis with regard to direct, vicarious, and
contributory liability.113
B. Findings by the Executive Branch: The White Paper
The judiciary is not the only branch of the government that has de-
bated the applicability of existing copyright laws to this new communica-
tions medium, the Internet. In 1993, President Clinton established the
Information Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF") 1 4 to aid in the develop-
ment of the National Information Infrastructure ("NI")."5 The NII is a
proposed telecommunications system that would integrate all computers,
telephones, radios, and fax machines in the country.1 6 A subcommittee
called the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (the "Working
Group") released a report, the White Paper, examining how the NIl
would affect the rights of intellectual property owners. " '
113. See, e.g., Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp.
1167, 1178, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that an ISP was not liable for direct and vicari-
ous copyright infringement, but may be held contributorily liable when copyrighted clip-
art was posted on the Internet through the ISP's service); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ
Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-13, 515 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (concluding that a BBS
operator is liable for direct and contributory copyright infringement when the operator's
involvement, engaging in limited screening to avoid pornography, constituted sufficient
volitional activity).
114. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 1 & app. 3. Twenty-six federal agencies and
other representatives from the private sector, public interest groups, Congress, and state
and local governments were involved in the development and application of information
technologies, comprising the IITF. See id. at 1. The federal agencies involved included
those focused on economics (the National Economic Counsel, the U.S. Department of
Commerce, and the U.S. Department of Treasury), humanities (the National Endowment
for the Arts and the U.S. Department of Education), research and technology (the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration, the U.S. Copyright Office and the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office), and others (the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Consumer Af-
fairs, and the National Security Agency). See id. at app. 3.
115. See id. at 1 (establishing the reasons for the formation of the IITF and its role in
the development of the NIL).
116. See id. at 7-8. According to one report, the NIl would increase the amount and
variety of information, entertainment, and cultural resources presently available; improve
educational and health care systems by linking students, educators, health professionals,
and patients together; and increase the ability for individuals to participate in the demo-
cratic process of government by making information available on the Internet and foster-
ing public participation. See id. at 7-9.
117. See id. at 2-3. Even though the NIl is a developing theory, the intellectual prop-
erty problems the NIt would face are presently occurring in the Internet context. See id. at
179 (referring to the Internet as the "prototype" for the NIl).
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The White Paper concluded that existing laws are adequate and effec-
tive, and recommended holding ISPs liable for all types of copyright in-
fringement for any unlawful activities by subscribers. 118 The Working
Group justified its position by arguing that ISPs benefit from unlawful
infringement by subscribers because the ability to upload copyrighted
material attracts a larger subscriber base." 9 Additionally, the Working
Group argued that ISPs hold a better position than authors or owners of
copyrighted material to police and discourage the unlawful activities of
their subscribers. ° The Working Group found that holding ISPs liable
for the unlawful acts of subscribers serves to encourage ISPs in the de-
velopment of contractual and technological mechanisms that guard
against infringement. 2' Despite the Working Group's recommendation
of strict liability, Congress took a different approach to the issue of ISP
liability.
C. Legislation Addressing the Difficulties of Copyright Infringement on
the Internet
Congress has endeavored to keep pace with the development of the
Internet and its ensuing problems by proposing amendments to the
Copyright Act of 1976.122 The Online Copyright Infringement Liability
118. See id. at 117 (stating that despite the integral role ISPs play in the further devel-
opment of the NIL, that position does not exclude ISPs from liability for copyright in-
fringement); see also Levi, supra note 2, at 551-52 (considering the White Paper's assess-
ment that the most effective way to protect the rights of copyright owners was to hold ISPs
liable for subscribers' unlawful activities).
119. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 117-18 (reporting that if ISPs "reap rewards
for infringing activity ... [then] [ijt is difficult to argue that they should not bear the re-
sponsibilities").
120. See id. at 123; see also Levi, supra note 2, at 552 (arguing that ISPs can discourage
infringing activities by requiring warranty and indemnification agreements, reserving the
right to remove infringing material or discontinuing the account of a subscriber acting un-
lawfully, and purchasing insurance to spread the costs incurred by a subscriber's infringing
behavior).
121. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 124 (rationalizing the Working Group's deci-
sion to not reduce or remove copyright liability by explaining that it serves as an "incen-
tive" for ISPs to react to and take responsibility for copyright infringement).
122. See Rojas, supra note 4, at 1032-34 (summarizing recent legislative activity that
would impact the Internet). Congress has shown its dedication to aiding the further de-
velopment of the Internet by stating its policy in this regard as follows:
It is the policy of the United States (1) to promote the continued development of
the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of technologies which maxi-
mize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services ....
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123Limitation Act, enacted October 28, 1998, amends current law by es-
tablishing limited liability for ISPs that unknowingly store and transmit
copyrighted material on their networks. 121
OCILLA limits an ISP's liability for on-line copyright infringement if it
meets certain conditions.12 ' The Act exempts an ISP from liability if it
transmits, routes, or provides intermediate and transient storage of mate-
rial that infringes on a copyright.' The exemption applies if the ISP did
not initiate the transmission or routing, the storage and transmission oc-
curred through an automatic technological process, the ISP did not select
the recipients of the material, and it did not change the contents of the
material. 7  OCILLA also releases an ISP from liability if it does not
have actual knowledge of the infringing behavior.'9 Alternatively, if the
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (1994).
123. Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201-03, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
OCILLA is found in Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
124. See generally 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Supp. 1999). Note that Congress enacted
two section 512s. See id. § 512 n.1. This paper concerns the section 512 entitled
"[limitations on liability relating to material online" rather than the section 512 entitled
"[dietermination of reasonable license fees for individual proprietors."
125. See id. § 512(a). This subsection provides:
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided
in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of
copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connec-
tions for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for
the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate and transient storage of
that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing connec-
tions, if -
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a per-
son other than the service provider;
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out
through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the
service provider;
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an
automatic response to the request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such in-
termediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a man-
ner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such
copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to
such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for
the transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without modifica-
tion of its content.
Id.
126. See id.
127. See id.; cf. Vermut, supra note 2, at 327-30 (explaining the implications of caching,
or the temporary storage of material, on the liability of ISPs).
128. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1).
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ISP does know about the infringement, it is not liable if it removes the
material expeditiously.129  The Act absolves ISPs of liability for claims
based on the disabling of access to, or removal of, allegedly infringing
material, regardless of whether the material encroaches on the rights of
another.3°
In order to have limited liability, ISPs must adopt, implement, and in-
form subscribers of a policy providing for the termination of the accounts
of repeat infringers.' ISPs are also required to accommodate any stan-
dard technical measures taken by copyright owners to identify or protect
their works. 32
If exempted under the Act, ISPs are protected from all monetary dam-
113ages for direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement. OCILLA
provides for injunctive relief by allowing courts to issue one or more
forms of orders to restrain an ISP."' The orders may direct an ISP to
terminate the accounts of subscribers that infringe on a copyright, to
block access to the infringing material, and any other less burdensome
injunctive relief that a court finds necessary to stop the infringing be-n • 135
havior. However, injunctive relief can be imposed only after the copy-right owner notifies the ISP of the alleged infringement, and the ISP has
129. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C). These limitations on liability apply only to ISPs with des-
ignated company agents who can receive notice of claimed infringements. See id.
§ 512(c)(2). The ISP must provide such contact information on its website and at the U.S.
Copyright Office so that copyright owners can notify the ISP of possible infringing activi-
ties. See id.
130. See id. § 512(g). The subsection provides in part:
a service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the
service provider's good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or ac-
tivity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which in-
fringing activity is apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ulti-
mately determined to be infringing.
Id. § 512(g)(1).
Any person who makes a knowingly false claim of infringement that results in the
removal or disabling of access to the material will be held liable for damages. See id.
§ 512(f).
131. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
132. See id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
133. See id. § 512(a)-(d). Monetary relief consists of "damages, costs, attorneys' fees,
and any other form of monetary payment." Id. § 512(k)(2).
134. See id. § 5120).
135. See id. § 5120)(1). A court deciding whether to impose an injunction against an
ISP is required to consider whether the order would significantly burden the ISP or the
ISP's system, how much the copyright owner would be harmed if the infringing action is
not restrained, whether it is technically feasible and effective to implement the injunction,
and whether there are less burdensome and comparably effective means to prohibit the
infringement. See id. § 5120)(2).
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the opportunity to appear in court."'
The parameters of copyright law have been fairly settled by the Consti-
tution, federal statute, and common law.' Unfortunately, though, in the
development of copyright law, the existence of a communications tool
such as the Internet was not considered.3 Since the dramatic evolution
of the Internet, new claims of copyright infringement against ISPs have
put law-making bodies in the position of applying already developed
copyright law to this new technology.39
III. THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE INTERNET DEFIES
CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW
Congress's attempt to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts' 40 culminated in the creation of economic rewards for authors and
artists who created and disseminated their ideas.14' As a result, the en-
forcement of copyright law has become a balancing of the exclusive
rights granted to creators of original works with the interest of society to
access that information.42 The difficulty in achieving that balance is no
more evident than when a copyright owner claims infringement by ISPs
and their subscribers.
Increased dependency on the Internet as a communications tool affects
the seriousness of damages incurred by copyright owners from infringe-
'43ment. Estimates of annual monetary loss incurred by copyright owners
136. See id. § 512(j)(3). The only exception to this occurs when the injunction is neces-
sary to preserve evidence or if it has no significant adverse effect on an ISP's network. See
id.
137. See supra Part L.A and II (discussing the complexities of copyright law and its in-
terpretations by the courts, Congress, and the executive branch).
138. See Maloney, supra note 71, at 230 (questioning whether the Copyright Act ade-
quately addresses the Internet environment).
139. See supra Part II (discussing how the various government branches have faced the
challenge of applying traditional copyright law to the Internet).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
141. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985). In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he economic phi-
losophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors ...." Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 202, 219 (1954) (holding that statuettes of human figures intended to be used
as bases for table lamps were "works of art" and valid copyrights).
142. See Levi, supra note 2, at 550 (stating that policy makers and the courts must pro-
tect intellectual property rights without adversely affecting the growth of the Internet).
143. See Rojas, supra note 4, at 1013 (contending that as businesses increasingly use
the Internet, damage from trespassing on intellectual property rights will become more
significant).
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stemming from on-line thievery reach into the billions.1" The judicial
and executive branches of the government have responded by applying
traditional copyright law that is based on print and broadcast media to
this new technology.14 The awkward and conflicting attempts to address
this issue have not reached the level of definitive rulings, leaving the is-
sue of ISP liability one of first impression to many courts.
14
1
Traditionally, copyright laws applied to well-recognized communica-
tions media such as written publications, audio broadcasts, and visual im-147
ages. When the copyright laws were drafted, little public interest or
knowledge existed about the Internet;' 4 therefore, the issues regardinga. 149
the Internet are not easily pigeon-holed into these existing paradigms.
A. Direct Infringement Liability as Applied to the Internet
Presently, liability for direct infringement is based on a strict liability
standard. Any invasion of the rights granted by the Copyright Act con-
stitutes infringement, regardless of the intent or knowledge of the in-
fringer.' The Working Group endorsed the traditional strict liability
144. See Cook, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing the international problem of copyright
infringement over the Internet). Federal law enforcement officials reported that $10 bil-
lion worth of data is stolen by on-line thieves annually. See id. The Business Software Al-
liance estimated in 1995 that software companies lost more than $15 billion per year in pi-
rated software. See id. Japan and Europe face nearly $6 billion in losses from pirated
software per year. See id.
145. See Rojas, supra note 4, at 1013 (identifying the applicability of traditional copy-
right law to the Internet as the main legal issue in the on-line context).
146. See Melone, supra note 65, at 493-94 (evincing that the Netcom decision did not
adequately address the liability of ISPs for the infringing acts of their subscribers). The
cases that have addressed the liability of ISPs consist of district court rulings on motions
for summary judgment. See supra Part II.A (discussing the relevant court decisions re-
garding ISP liability). In an effort to resolve confusion surrounding ISP liability, the IITA
discouraged changing the severity of liability levied against ISPs. See WHITE PAPER, su-
pra note 5, at 122.
147. See Rojas, supra note 4, at 1016 (stating that claims were traditionally brought
against newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters).
148. See Maloney, supra note 71, at 230 (acknowledging that despite the abundant de-
bates regarding liability of ISPs for copyright infringement, it is still unclear if and what
Internet activities are proscribed by the Copyright Act).
149. See Rojas, supra note 4, at 1016-17 (examining the various standards employed by
courts when applying existing case law to issues arising in the context of the Internet).
150. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (establishing the elements of direct copyright
infringement); see also supra Part I.A.1 (describing direct copyright liability). The ele-
ments of direct copyright infringement require proof of ownership of a valid copyright and
the copying of the copyrighted material. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (stating that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner.., is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author").
[Vol. 48:12371260
Copyright Infringement on the Internet
standard for Internet copyright infringement, believing it would be pre-
mature to reduce the liability of ISPs.1 2 It justified its recommendation
on the basis that allowing ISPs to refuse to take responsibility for action
occurring on their networks would be unfair to Internet users and copy-
right owners.13 According to the Working Group, lifting the responsibil-
ity from ISPs would encourage intentional willful ignorance of the unlaw-
154ful behavior of subscribers.
Application of the strict liability standard will almost always result in a
finding of liability on the part of the ISP because typically the actual
copying of the material occurs on the ISP's system.'55 If ISPs face such a
great risk of liability, they may decide not to operate and effectively shut
down the Internet."' In the alternative, ISPs could review each docu-
ment or message transmitted through their systems, significantly in-
creasing operating costs."' Access to the Internet would become more
expensive and exclusive, negating the low-cost and expansive benefits so-
ciety presently receives from use of the Internet. Holding ISPs to a
152. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 115, 122 (explaining that vicarious and con-
tributory liability have a higher threshold of proof than the strict liability of direct in-
fringement and consequently would not adequately protect the rights of copyright own-
ers).
153. See id. at 122 (contending that because ISPs perform many functions, including
acting as an electronic publisher and providing the transmission wires like a telephone
company, ISPs can not be considered for total exemption of liability when they maintain
some control over their systems).
154. See id. This argument rests on the belief that reducing the standard from strict
liability would induce ISPs to ignore infringing behavior by providing a disincentive to po-
lice their networks. See Cook, supra note 1, at 61 (dubbing this behavior as the "ostrich
approach"). The Working Group also theorized that given the chance to avoid responsi-
bility, ISPs would avoid pursuing the development of tools that could lessen the risk of
infringement for ISPs and copyright owners. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 123.
Such tools currently include indemnification and warranty agreements, license agree-
ments, education for subscribers regarding unlawful infringement, and technological
methods of tracking information. See id.
155. See Cook, supra note 1, at 60 (describing the result of applying strict liability to
ISPs). Many ISPs practice automatic "caching," where transmitted data is temporarily
copied and stored on the ISP's network. See id.; see also Vermut, supra note 2, at 276 (ex-
plaining the technical process involved in caching and why ISPs employ this mechanism).
ISPs use caching because it is easier for the ISP to supply the data to other requests from
its own database without having to request the information from another ISP's network.
See id.
156. See Kirkwood, supra note 44, at 728 (arguing that subjecting ISPs to a direct li-
ability standard would have devastating effects on the future development of the Inter-
net).
157. See id.
158. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits the Internet
provides to society as an inexpensive communications tool).
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strict liability standard would create an imbalance between the rights of
the copyright owner and the rights of the public. 9
The court in Playboy applied the traditional standard for direct liabil-
ity in holding a BBS operator directly liable for copyright infringement
of Playboy pictures.' 60 The copyright owner demonstrated the existence
of infringement by proving that it legally owned the copyrights to the
photographs and inferentially proved that the BBS operator copied the
pictures.' Following the established doctrine of direct liability, the court
did not consider lack of intent or knowledge. 62
Any possible clarity regarding direct liability is muddied by court deci-
sions that changed the elements of direct liability when analyzing claims
of alleged Internet infringement.6 1 In considering the liability of ISPs for
direct copyright infringement, the court in Netcom added a component to
the traditional two-part test.'6 It held that in order to find an ISP di-
rectly liable for the reproduction of copyrighted material by a subscriber,
an element of volition or causation by the ISP must be present. The
court reasoned that the copying by Netcom was an incidental action nec-S 166
essary in the running of an Internet access network. Therefore, under
159. See Kirkwood, supra note 44, at 728 (arguing that direct liability over-burdens
ISPs by placing the interests of the copyright owner above the societal interest in the free
flow of information). But cf Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368, 1372-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (outlining the ability of ISPs
to monitor and control on-line infringement). One commentator argues that ISPs possess
the ability to control the on-line environment through the use and enforcement of written
control policies, the placement and enforcement of warnings on their networks against
improper actions, installing software capable of monitoring subscriber activity, recording
subscriber activity, and by quickly and effectively handling improper traffic on the net-
work. See Cook, supra note 1, at 62. These actions by the ISP would increase its operating
costs and would eventually be reflected in the rates charged to subscribers. See Kirkwood,
supra note 44, at 728 (arguing that imposing direct copyright infringement liability on ISPs
may have detrimental effects on the future development of the Internet).
160. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
The court held that there was "irrefutable evidence of direct copyright infringement" by
the BBS operator. Id. at 1559.
161. See id. at 1556. Proof of ownership was satisfied by producing the copyright regis-
trations of the photographs. See id. Copying was established by showing the BBS opera-
tor had access to the pictures, the infringing photos were substantially similar to the origi-
nal works, and statutorily guaranteed rights of public distribution and display were
implicated by the operator's actions. See id. at 1556-57.
162. See id. at 1559.
163. Cf. Cook, supra note 1, at 60-61 (contending that the court in Netcom misapplied
current copyright law).
164. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370.
165. See id. at 1370.
166. See id. at 1368-69. The court explained that Netcom's system operates without
human intervention when it temporarily creates copies of transmitted information, how-
[Vol. 48:12371262
Copyright Infringement on the Internet
Netcom, an ISP is liable only if it deliberately caused the duplication of
the copyrighted work.67
B. Vicarious Infringement Liability as Applied to the Internet
Under the common law tort theory of respondeat superior, an ISP may
be found vicariously liable for infringement when it is proven first, that
the ISP had the ability to control the infringement, and second, that the
ISP received a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity.68
While direct liability favors copyright owners and places a heavy burden
on ISPs, vicarious liability tips the scale in the other direction, and favors
ISPs. 169 This inequity results from the difficulty copyright owners face in
proving the elements of vicarious liability.170
Whether an ISP has the ability to control a subscriber's conduct de-
pends on the availability of technological resources. 7' Theoretically,
ISPs already monitor and record subscriber activityi7 and possess sophis-
ticated hardware and software that can screen posted information for in-
fringing material.173 Although larger ISPs usually have this sort of capa-
ever Netcom does not cause the copying. See id.
167. See id. The court explained the distinction between incidental and deliberate
copying by analogizing the role of an ISP to that of a copy machine owner who allows
third parties access to the machine. See id. at 1369. A user of the copier may directly in-
fringe on the copyright of another, but the owner of the copier is not held directly liable
for the actions of the user because, although the owner provided the means for copying, he
did not do the actual reproduction. See id.
168. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing the elements and history of the doctrine of vi-
carious liability for copyright infringement).
169. See Cahoy, supra note 62, at 348 (stating that courts addressing the vicarious li-
ability of ISPs seem reluctant to find the ISPs liable for copyright infringement).
170. See id. (explaining that copyright owners face a difficult challenge in proving the
elements of vicarious liability with regard to whether an ISP directly profits from the in-
fringement).
171. Cf. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76 (deliberating whether Netcom had the tech-
nical ability to supervise subscriber activity since the plaintiff, RTC, offered no evidence
that the ISP could use software to identify possible copyright infringements).
172. See Cook, supra note 1, at 61 (arguing that ISPs possess the technology to moni-
tor their networks and therefore, are the best suited entities to be "gatekeepers" of the
Internet).
173. See id. at 62 (extrapolating from Netcom that large ISPs have software capable of
monitoring for infringing material). But see Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73 (stating that
it is impossible to discern infringing from non-infringing material on the Internet because
billions of bits of data are transmitted and stored on network servers).
Members of the Internet communications community have developed various
technological tools that would raise the level of protection for copyright owners. See
ITAA DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at *18-24. These developments include "digital water-
marks" which notify users of the copyright owner, the creator, and payment information;
"cryptographic envelopes" which act as a container for encrypted documents; digital
headers, originally designed to let parents control what their children access on the Inter-
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bility, smaller companies providing Internet access may be unable to se-
cure this type of monitoring for technological or economic reasons.14 In
Netcom, the ISP defendant argued that the speed and volume of informa-
tion sent through the network made it impossible to screen all messages
prior to the time they were posted.'75 The plaintiff, RTC, countered with
evidence that Netcom had previously exercised its ability to police sub-
scriber activity by suspending and deleting various postings.' The court
found that whether the sanctioning of subscribers occurred before or af-
ter the information was posted was immaterial to Netcom's ability to
control those actions.77 The court, however, left this matter unresolved,
stating only that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the ability of
the ISP to control the activities of its subscribers. 78
The second prong of the test for vicarious liability, whether ISPs re-
ceive direct financial gain from the infringing activity, may be even
harder for a copyright owner to prove.179 The court in Netcom analogized
an ISP's position to that of a landlord renting space 8 The court justified
this comparison on the basis of the fixed fees common to both situa-
tions.18' The importance of drawing this parallel lies in the belief that the
net, which label posted information with a description of the document's content; registra-
tion and licensing services that search the Internet for copies of registered material; and
password vending services that provide authorized access to locked documents. See id.
(providing a list of companies and the technological tools they are marketing).
174. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368. The court stated that unlike some of the larger
ISPs, Netcom did not control or monitor the content of the information that was transmit-
ted through its network, even though it could reprogram its system to screen out postings
containing specific words or coming from certain individuals. See id. at 1368. The court
also noted that the plaintiff in this case never produced any evidence that it was possible to
design software to detect copyright infringement. See id. at 1376 n.23.
175. See id. at 1376.
176. See id. The plaintiffs provided evidence that Netcom had suspended the accounts
of subscribers more than one thousand times for commercial advertising, obscene materi-
als, and off-topic postings. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Cahoy, supra note 62, at 348 (explaining that the difficulty of proving direct
financial gain lies in the flat rate that most ISPs charge for a specific amount of access
time).
180. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376 (affirming that a landlord with the right and
ability to supervise the activities of a tenant will be vicariously liable for the tenant's in-
fringement if the rental amount is proportional to the proceeds of the sales made by the
tenant).
181. See id. at 1376. Netcom charged subscribers a flat rate for unlimited connection
time. See id. at 1377. In this regard, Netcom conformed to the practices of other ISPs. See
Cahoy, supra note 62, at 349 n.80 (noting that fixed subscriber rates prevents finding an
ISP vicariously liable if the ISP does not benefit financially from the amount of time the
subscriber is connected to the Internet).
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fixed charges imposed by a landlord do not depend on the nature of the
lessee's activity. '82 The court held that Netcom did not receive a direct
financial benefit from the infringing activities of its subscriber because a
flat rate was charged irrespective of the subscriber's conduct."'
The court's rationale in Netcom is now in question because of Fono-
visa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,'s a decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.'85 The appellate decision in Fonovisa
came down two months after the district court in Netcom relied on the
reasoning of the Fonovisa district court. 86 In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit
held that even though vendors paid a fixed rate to participate, a swap
meet coordinator received a direct financial benefit from the sale of pi-
rated recordings by a vendor, since customers were "drawn" to the event
by the infringing conduct."' Under this "draw theory," ISPs may be vi-
cariously liable if the infringing activity "enhance[d] the attractiveness of
the venue" by drawing new customers to the ISP's service.' Even
though the factual circumstances in Fonovisa do not address the Internet,
182. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376; cf Roy Export Co. Establish. v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that no financial benefit
is gained from the leasing of a university building for a fixed rate where bootlegged films
were shown).
183. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
184. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
185. See id.; see also Shulman, supra note 6, at 590-99 (applying the facts of Netcom to
the appeals court's reasoning in Fonovisa). Even though the Sega decisions were decided
by a different district court than Fonovisa, both are within the Ninth Circuit, in which the
appeals court had overruled Fonovisa. Compare Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp.
923, 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996), with Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259.
186. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 590 n.285.
187. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64. In Fonovisa, the defendants operated a swap
meet in which individual vendors paid a rental fee for space and customers purchased
merchandise from the vendors. See id. at 261. The operators knew that vendors were
selling counterfeit recordings that violated Fonovisa's copyrights, but failed to exercise
their right to exclude any vendor, at any time, for any reason. See id. The financial benefit
came from the sale of admission fees, parking fees, and concession sales flowing directly
from customers that came to the swap meet in order to buy the pirated recordings. See id.
at 263.
188. Kirkwood, supra note 44, at 720, 731-32 (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64)
(advocating that the draw test should be applied by courts to determine if ISPs received a
direct financial benefit from infringing conduct). The benefit of the draw test is that it ac-
counts for the number of times the copyrighted material was infringed upon as well as the
financial value of the material. See id. at 731-32. Theoretically, if a work was only in-
fringed upon a couple of times, the copyright owner would not lose the amount of money
he would have lost if the material was infringed upon thousands of times. See id. By
placing a monitoring requirement on ISPs obligating them to track the Internet sites that
constituted a sufficient "draw," the costs of policing the network would be lowered and
the rights of the copyright owner would be protected. See id.
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the Netcom court's reliance on what is now an overruled decision brings
more confusion to whether an ISP receives a direct financial benefit from
a subscriber's infringing actions.19
C. Contributory Infringement Liability as Applied to the Internet
The doctrine of contributory liability holds the most promise for
equally balancing the copyright owners' interest in protecting their work
and the interest of society in the free flow of information.'9 In order to
be held contributorily liable, an ISP must have substantially contributed
to the infringing behavior of its subscriber and must have known or
should have known of the infringement.' 9 Under this standard, ISPs do
not escape liability altogether, but at the same time are not held respon-
sible for all transmissions occurring on their networks. 92 The "knowl-
edge" element in contributory liability permits copyright owners to pur-
sue a viable remedy against ISPs if an infringement of their material
193
occurs.
The court in Netcom devoted little time to discussing whether the ISP
substantially participated in the infringing activity of its subscriber.' 9 Al-
though the court analogized the role of an ISP to that of a landlord with
regard to vicarious liability, it distinguished this analogy with regard to
contributory liability.'95 Unlike a landlord renting space, an ISP may act
to prevent further damage to the rights of a copyright owner by blocking
189. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 590-95 (suggesting that the Fonovisa analysis is an
inappropriate comparison to the facts and circumstances of Netcom). Another factor dis-
tinguishing the rationale enunciated in the Fonovisa decision from the analysis applied in
Netcom is the court's finding that the swap meet operator was aware of the sale of the pi-
rated recordings and solicited sales by providing the venue and advertising to attract cus-
tomers. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. Even though Netcom received notice of an alleged
infringement, Netcom did not actively solicit customers as the swap meet operator did in
Fonovisa. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1366; see also supra notes 90-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the notice received by Netcom and its response to RTC's request that ac-
cess to the allegedly infringing material be blocked).
190. See Melone, supra note 65, at 501.
191. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d, 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971); see also supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the background of contributory
liability).
192. But see Melone, supra note 65, at 503 (stating that "[tjhe only equitable result
mandates that liability be imputed solely upon the direct infringer").
193. See id. at 503-04 (arguing that the rights of copyright owners are sufficiently pro-
tected if they are allowed to bring a claim of vicarious liability against ISPs).
194. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
195. See id. (determining that Netcom's automatic distribution of material through its
network is more similar to radio stations rebroadcasting infringing works than landlords
renting space).
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access to information posted on its network. 96 The court explained that
an ISP maintains control over how its system is used in order to provide
the means for individuals to access and distribute material on the Inter-
net.l9 Assuming Netcom possessed the technical measures to prevent
the infringement, the court found that this control could amount to aid-
ing the infringing behavior, thus, meeting the "substantial participation"
requirement for a claim of contributory liability!"8
Under the theory of contributory liability, an ISP must have known or
should have known of the infringement!" Proving that notice was given
to the ISP would show that it had knowledge of the infringement and
that it had a chance to take action to prevent further damage to the value
of the copyright.2° In Netcom, the court held that a genuine issue of fact
existed with regard to notice because Netcom received a letter from the
copyright owner alleging infringement. 21 According to the court, even
though a "mere unsupported allegation of infringement" may not consti-
tute notice, the lack of evidentiary support provided by the copyright
owner does not create the unequivocal assumption that Netcom had no
knowledge of the infringing activity. 2 Therefore, questions of what con-
stitutes notice in the on-line environment is still one of first impression
203after the Netcom decision.
Some commentators, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Sony,
argue that the legitimate purposes for which the Internet is substantially
used should be considered when deciding to impose liability on an ISP.20
In Sony, the Court rejected a claim by owners of copyrighted television




199. See id. at 1373 (relying on Gershwin Publ'g Co. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971)); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (stating
the element of knowledge required for a finding of contributory liability).
200. Cf. Cook, supra note 1, at 62 (arguing that ISPs are in the best position to receive
notices of infringement, and have the technical capability to block access or remove the
material from the Internet).
201. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374; see also supra note 92, (describing the responses
to the letter by Netcom and the BBS operator).
202. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
203. See id.
204. See Melone, supra note 65, at 502-03 (using Sony as support for the argument that
the substantial benefits of the Internet, when it is legitimately used, outweigh any harm
from incidents of sporadic infringement); Shulman, supra note 6, at 598 (arguing that an
ISP would not be held contributorily liable if it could prove that its service was mostly
used for non-infringing purposes).
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contributorily liable for the taping of television shows by private view-205
ers. The Court based its decision on its finding that VCRs were pri-
marily used for substantially non-infringing uses.0 6 If courts apply this
reasoning in Internet copyright cases, ISPs could make a credible claim
that the Internet is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable pur-
207
poses.
In the on-line context, the validity of a claim of contributory liability
depends on the ISP's knowledge and participation in the infringement, as
well as the Internet's overall purpose.9 The Netcom court found con-
tributory liability yielded a fair remedy as long as an ISP can reduce fu-
ture harm to the value of a copyright after it becomes aware of the in-
.209
fringement. This standard would protect the interests of copyright
owners as well as the interests of ISPs and society."'
The legitimacy of contributory liability also rests on the balancing of
rights between the copyright owner and the ISP. The exclusive rights of
a copyright owner would not be discarded because ISPs would be held
accountable when they learn of an infringement and fail to take action.2 '
Requiring actual or constructive knowledge would absolve ISPs of the
responsibility of looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack by not
212imposing a duty to police millions of non-infringing transmissions. Al-
though contributory liability seems to fairly balance all of the interests
involved, the underdeveloped body of case law has left the Internet
community with an unclear picture of what actions constitute liability for
copyright infringement.213
205. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
206. See id.
207. See Shulman, supra note 6, at 598-99 (applying the Sony decision to the claim of
contributory copyright liability of ISPs). Compare supra text accompanying notes 2-3, 59-
61 (quoting the usage rates of the Internet), with supra note 144 and accompanying text
(quoting the statistics on the amount of copyright infringement on the Internet).
208. See supra notes 194-207 and accompanying text (discussing the ability to find an
ISP liable for contributory infringement on the Internet).
209. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
210. See Melone, supra note 65, at 502-03 (maintaining that the courts should adopt
the contributory liability standard).
211. Seeid.at503.
212. Cf. id. at 503-04 (arguing that the notice required under the contributory liability
standard prevents ISPs from being overburdened with the task of searching for potential
infringements on their system). The burden on ISPs, on the economic cost of Internet ac-
cess, and on free expression would be tremendous if ISPs were responsible for screening
and judging each claim of infringement. See id.
213. See Rojas, supra note 4, at 1015 (stating that courts must rely on analogous forms
of media because of the lack of definitive decisions in the case law regarding copyright in-
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IV. OCILLA CLARIFIES How COPYRIGHT LAWS APPLY TO INTERNET
SERVICE PROVIDERS
Congressional action offers the best mechanism for both adequately
protecting the rights of copyright owners and supporting the public's in-
terest in the freedom to access information.1 Conflicting court decisions
and executive findings do not sufficiently protect the rights of copyright
owners, Internet users, and ISPs. 215 The Working Group's report on in-
tellectual property rights also included a call to Congress to resolve the
issue of ISP liability for copyright ringement.21 Recognizing this need
for guidance, Congress passed OCILLA, which tailors traditional copy-
right laws to the Internet.
217
A. Why Legislation was Necessary
Thomas Jefferson, the first head of the United States Patent Office,
succinctly characterized the relationship between law and new technol-
218
ogy. He said:
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitu-
tions. But laws and institutions must go hand and hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
fringement liability of ISPs). But cf Cahoy, supra note 62, at 353-54, 359 (asserting that
legislation is not necessary to clarify how copyright laws specifically apply to ISPs because
the law already balances the interests of copyright owners, the public, and ISPs).
214. See Carlos J. Moorhead, Q: Is Congress Turning the Internet into an Information
Toll Road? No: Protecting Copyright Will Make the Internet User-Friendly to Authors and
Consumers Alike, INSIGHT MAG. Jan. 15, 1996, at 25, available in 1996 WL 8310692, at *2
(arguing that proposed legislation to amend copyright law as the culmination of adminis-
trative, congressional and private information, is the best way to protect intellectual prop-
erty on the Internet). But see James Boyle, Q: Is Congress Turning the Internet into an In-
formation Toll Road? Yes: The Senate Would Whack Away at 'Fair Use' of Electronic
Documents Needed for News and Education, INSIGHT MAG. Jan. 15, 1996, at 24, available
in 1996 WL 8310691, at *4 (disagreeing with amendments to the copyright laws because
they would stifle the economic and cultural growth of the Internet).
215. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of definitive rul-
ings regarding liability of ISPs for copyright infringement); see also Rojas, supra note 4, at
1031-32 (arguing that courts will have to "muddle through" the application of existing
copyright law to the Internet until Congress outlines the parameters that should be exer-
cised by the courts).
216. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 17. The Working Group argues that:
With no more than minor clarification and limited amendment, the Copyright
Act will provide the necessary balance of protection of rights-and limitations on
those rights-to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Existing
copyright law needs only the fine tuning that technological advances necessitate,
in order to maintain the balance of the law in the face of onrushing technology.
Id. (footnote omitted).
217. See generally OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Supp. 1999).
218. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 13 n.24.
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more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths dis-
covered and manners and opinions change, with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with
the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy .... 219
The unique environment of the Internet requires this type of legislative
guidance for a variety of reasons. The courts have not effectively applied
existing copyright laws to alleged infringement on the Internet in a way
that equitably balances the rights of all interested parties."" Netcom
showed the most in-depth application of copyright law, but the court
ruled only on a motion for summary judgment, after which the parties
settled the case.2 ' The traditional standards of direct and vicarious li-
ability favor the interests of one party over another, unequally balancing
the rights of the copyright owner with society's interest in the free flow of
12information. In particular, the Netcom court added the elements of
volition and causation to its strict liability inquiry because it held it would
be unfair to follow the existing standard set out in the Copyright Act.223
The Netcom court's reliance on a subsequently overruled case creates
uncertainty with regard to its holding concerning contributory liability.224
OCILLA's amendment of the Copyright Act provides a definitive
ruling in the wake of conflicting interpretations of copyright laws and the
policing capabilities of ISPs in the on-line context.12' This federal man-
date outlines specific guidelines for ISPs to follow, rather than leaving
226them to interpret conflicting decisions. The quick legislative action
219. Id. (quoting the inscription at the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.).
220. See supra Part III (analyzing the confusion of applying traditional copyright law
to copyright infringement occurring on the Internet). But see Cahoy, supra note 62, at
353-59 (contending that the courts have demonstrated their ability to interpret copyright
law flexibly, precluding the need for legislative action).
221. See Melone, supra note 65, at 502 (stating that the multiple claims of RTC against
Netcom were not resolved because of the settlement, leaving the issue of ISP liability un-
decided).
222. See generally id. at 495-501 (using various court decisions to demonstrate that vi-
carious liability standards do not equitably balance the interests of copyright owners, the
public, and ISPs).
223. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995); supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (discussing
the Netcom court's ruling regarding direct liability for copyright infringement and its de-
pendence on Fonovisa).
224. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (examining contributory liability
and the uncertainty of this standard since the overruling of Fonovisa).
225. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N.
645, 655 (stating that OCILLA clarifies an ISP's legal responsibilities with regard to on-
line infringement).
226. See id.; see also Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 651-52 (espousing the belief that ISPs
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also shortens the time in which ISPs, copyright owners, and users of the
Internet confront the risk of incurring damage or liability while the
courts determine how to consistently apply copyright laws to the Inter-
net.227 The Act creates predictable guidelines enabling ISPs to run their
businesses despite the conflicting laws that differ by jurisdiction.
B. OCILLA Sufficiently Protects the Interests of Service Providers,
Copyright Owners, and the Public
OCILLA affirms the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners and
defines reasonable terms under which ISPs may be held liable for copy-
right infringement without hindering public access to the Internet.22 9
Clarification of liabilities and responsibilities also encourages ISPs to
fully invest their own resources and to attract other investors so that the
Internet can continue to grow and develop."3  Congress expects
need legislative guidance in order to conduct their businesses effectively).
227. Cf. Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 651 (discussing the security in having "certainty and
predictability through legislation"). But see Cahoy, supra note 62, at 354 (arguing that the
courts should have the time to "slowly build a coherent structure for analyzing liability
that is fluid and responsive to changes in technology"). The Supreme Court and the lower
courts have deferred to Congress when major technological developments change the
commercial market. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
431 (1984). The Supreme Court explained this posture stating that "[sjound policy, as well
as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological inno-
vations alter the market for copyrighted materials." Id. The Netcom court added,
"[w]hether a new exemption should be carved out for online service providers is to be re-
solved by Congress, not the courts." Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12 (refusing to create
liability exemptions for ISPs similar to those for common carriers that provide only wire
and conduit for the transport of information).
228. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998) reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
655 (declaring that OCILLA "provides greater certainty to service providers concerning
their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their activities").
See also Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 651-52 (answering the question, whether legislation is
needed to protect the business opportunities of ISPs, in the affirmative).
Absent legislation, ISPs face the possibility of litigating similar issues in different
ways, with different outcomes because of the inconsistency between jurisdictions. See id.
at 651. Expanding on this possibility, theoretically, because the Internet has reached
global proportions, the ISPs' operating procedures would be difficult to tailor to specific
geographic areas. Consequently, ISPs would face the possibility that they will not meet all
the requirements in a jurisdiction and would have to incur litigation costs, which would
eventually affect the cost charged to subscribers. For more detailed discussion of the is-
sues of jurisdiction and the Internet, see John A. Lowther, IV, Comment, Personal Juris-
diction and the Internet Quagmire: Amputating Judicially Created Long-Arms, 35 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 619 (1998) (discussing whether activities conducted on the Internet are
sufficient to subject a person or business to a civil suit in a foreign state).
229. See generally 144 CONG. REC. S4887, S4889 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Ashcroft) (supporting the amendment to the copyright laws exempting providers
of Internet access)-
230. See 144 CONG. REC. S11,889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
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OCILLA to "preserve[] strong incentives for service providers and copy-
right owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringe-
ments that take place in the digital networked environment." '231
OCILLA provides a claim against ISPs under the direct liability stan-
dard that is still available to copyright owners.232 If a copyright owner
proves under the traditional direct liability doctrine that the ISP copied
material that was copyrighted by the claimant, an ISP would be held di-
rectly liable.233 OCILLA, however, exempts the ISP from this liability if
certain conditions are met.234 Congress intended for these limitations on
liability to apply only if the ISP is liable under existing principles of
law.
235
OCILLA's exemptions reasonably limit the ability of copyright owners
to pursue claims against ISPs for infringing transmissions that the ISPs
did not initiate or transmit through non-automatic means.236 These pro-
visions do not require ISPs to independently monitor their networks for
infringing material, preventing ISPs from being overly burdened with the
responsibility of policing every transmission that occurs on their net-
works. 23' The burden of stopping infringing behavior, however, is still
shared with copyright owners because ISPs are held responsible for in-
fringements about which they receive notice.238 Congress intends to ex-
(supporting OCILLA). OCILLA encourages the further development of the Internet by
applying the limitations on liability to networks "operated by or for the service provider,"
thereby including ISPs and subcontractors who operate parts of or the entire network of
an ISP. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 73, reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 655.
231. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72, reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 655.
232. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a) (West Supp. 1999) (holding ISPs exempt from
liability for direct copyright infringement if they meet the stated requirements).
233. See id.; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fl.
1994) (applying only the elements of direct liability in the context of on-line infringement
of copyrighted material).
234. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a) (West Supp. 1999). The exemptions apply to
the transmitting, routing or providing of connections if: the ISP did not initiate the trans-
mission, the transmission occurred through a technical and automatic process, the ISP did
not select the material, the ISP did not maintain a copy of the material in a manner not
ordinarily necessary for the transmission, and the content of the material was not altered
during the transmission. See id.
235. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 73, reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 655.
236. Limiting the ability of copyright owners to pursue a claim in this manner respects
the large amount of information that passes through an ISPs system daily through auto-
matic and technical processes, without interference by the ISP. See supra note 61 and ac-
companying text (detailing the number of transmissions that occur on ISPs' systems).
237. See 144 CONG. REc. H10,067 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (joint explanatory statement
of the committee of conference) (stating that OCILLA is not meant to discourage ISPs
from implementing monitoring systems, even though the Act does not require them to po-
lice their networks without notification of alleged infringement).
238. See infra note 252 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations of ISPs when
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clude the ISPs that implement a monitoring program from liability. 239
This approach respects the technical operations of an automated ISP
network and provides specific guidelines for the ISPs to conduct their
business in compliance with the law. 4°
OCILLA, equitably balancing the rights of the copyright owner and
the ISP, also preserves the ability for copyright owners to pursue claims
against ISPs for vicarious and contributory liability. An ISP may be held
vicariously or contributorily liable if the ISP had actual knowledge that
copyrighted material was being infringed upon,241 was aware of circum-
stances that made the infringing activity apparent,242 or received a direct
financial benefit from the infringing conduct if the ISP had the ability
• • 243
and the right to control the information. The Act mimics existing law
in this regard,244 but OCILLA excludes monetary damages from beingS 245
levied against the ISP if it meets the Act's requirements. This provi-
sion prevents the payment of potentially large sums of money for in-
fringement of which the ISP was not aware and from which the ISP did
not receive any direct profit.246 If an ISP knew of the infringement or re-
ceived a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity, a copyright
they receive notice of a possible copyright infringement).
239. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 73, reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 655
(asserting that OCILLA is not meant to discourage ISPs from engaging in monitoring
practices of their networks). Congress provided that "[clourts should not conclude that
the service provider loses eligibility for limitations on liability under section 512 solely be-
cause it engaged in a monitoring program." See id.
240. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (exempting ISPs if "the
transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out through an auto-
matic technical process without selection of the material by the service provider").
241. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
242. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
243. See id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
244. See supra Parts I.A.2 and I.A.3 (explaining the doctrines of vicarious copyright
liability and contributory copyright liability).
245. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1); see also infra notes 248-51 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing the incorporation of equitable relief into OCILLA).
246. See Ronald L. Plesser and James J. Halpert, Internet Legislation in the 105th Con-
gress, COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UPDATE
(Piper & Marbury L.L.P., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1998, at 5 (theorizing that the limita-
tions on liability will "encourag[e] settlements based largely upon injunctive relief because
... the plaintiff will often have little possibility of obtaining damages or attorneys' fees").
The Act fails to suggest what constitutes a direct financial benefit, so it is unclear if fixed
rates charged by ISPs would constitute a direct financial benefit. See OCILLA, 17
U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B). The Netcom court decided that providing services on a fixed fee
was unrelated to the content accessed and thus the time spent on the Internet did not con-
stitute a direct financial benefit. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communica-
tion Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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owner would be entitled to seek monetary damages.247
While OCILLA exempts ISPs from monetary damages, the Act clearly
provides for injunctive relief for direct, vicarious and contributory liabil-
ity.148 OCILLA sets out the forms of injunctive relief available and limits
them to actions "necessary to prevent or restrain infringement of copy-
righted material ... if such relief is the least burdensome to the service
provider."249  These provisions provide the copyright owner with the
means to stop the infringing behavior without unfairly burdening the
ISP."O The interests of the copyright owner are protected by providing a
feasible remedy, while still allowing the Internet to freely develop as a
communications tool.
2 51
OCILLA goes even further to ensure that the interests of copyright
owners are protected by making certain that ISPs do not escape all re-
sponsibility for the infringing activities occurring on their networks.
OCILLA requires an ISP to expeditiously remove or disable access to
any allegedly infringing material on its network when it receives written
notice from the copyright owner.
An ISP faces the double-edged sword of potential lawsuits from both
the copyright owner and the subscriber once notice of an alleged in-
253fringement is received. Prior to the enactment of OCILLA, when an
247. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c).
248. See id. § 5120).
249. Id. § 512(j)(1)(A)(iii).
250. Cf. Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 652 (asserting that a legislative mandate providing
for the immediate removal of infringing material by ISPs upon receiving notice is in the
best interests of ISPs and copyright owners).
251. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the ways in which OCILLA allows the Internet to
continue expanding while protecting the rights of copyright owners). The exclusion of
monetary damages makes the ability of copyright owners to pursue injunctive relief even
more important because parties will be more likely to enter into settlements based on in-
junctive relief if copyright owners are less likely to recover damages or attorneys' fees. See
Plesser & Halpert, supra note 246, at 5 (analyzing the actions taken by Congress regarding
the Internet).
252. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g). Notification must include a signature of
someone authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner, identification of the copy-
righted work that is allegedly infringed upon, sufficient information to locate and block
the infringing material, contact information for the complaining party, a statement of the
complaining party's good faith belief that the material was used in an unauthorized man-
ner, and a statement that the notice is accurate and that the complaining party is author-
ized to act on behalf of the copyright owner. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A).
The interests of the subscriber who posted the allegedly infringing material are
also protected because ISPs are required to notify the subscriber of the claim of infringe-
ment so that the subscriber may respond to the complaint. See id. § 512(g)(3).
253. See Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 651-52 (discussing the need for legislative guidance
to protect ISPs form unnecessary and costly litigation).
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ISP received notice of an alleged infringement, the ISP faced possible
litigation with all potential courses of action. A claim could have been
brought either by the copyright owner against the ISP who refused to
remove the material, or by the individual that transmitted the material,
claiming the ISP violated his or her rights of privacy and freedom of ex-
pression. 4 The Act allows ISPs to remove or block access to allegedly
infringing material, regardless of whether it actually infringes on the
rights of another, without a potential suit brought by the party that
transmitted the information.2" This further protects the interests of
copyright owners because ISPs will be encouraged to investigate any
claims of infringement without facing further litigation brought by sub-
256
scribers whose material was blocked .
If OCILLA had been enacted prior to the Netcom decision, the issue
of liability would have been analyzed differently.257 The court held that
Netcom was not directly or vicariously liable for the infringing acts of
one of its subscribers,258 but found that it may be contributorily liable .
Assume, arguendo, that Netcom was found contributorily liable. Netcom
did not initiate the transmission of the infringing material, the transmis-
sion and storage of the information was through an automatic process,
and Netcom did not chose the recipients of the transmission or change
the contents thereof; RTC though, gave Netcom notice of the alleged in-
260fringement. Pursuant to the notice requirements of OCILLA, because
Netcom received adequate notice of the infringement, it would be re-
254. See id. at 652. William Cook, Chairman of the Computer Law Section of the Na-
tional Intellectual Property Institute, proposed a legislative solution when he testified be-
fore the U.S. House Judiciary Committee about amending the Copyright Act. See id.
Cook's proposition entailed a copyright owner notifying the ISP of the location of the al-
leged infringement, after which the ISP would place the material in a "penalty box" that
could not be accessed. See Cook, supra note 1, at 62. While in the box, both sides would
have the opportunity to offer proof of copyright ownership and justify the use of the mate-
rial. See id. The drawback of this approach is that the ISP must judge the validity of the
copyright claim and the justification of the subscriber, a role more suited for a judge or
jury.
255. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g).
256. But see Cahoy, supra note 62, at 358 (arguing that excluding monetary damages
from the remedies against ISPs for removal of alleged infringing material decreases the
incentive to investigate infringement claims).
257. Cf Cahoy, supra note 62, at 354 (asserting that legislation addressing ISP liability
would force the judiciary to apply the same legal framework to most cases regarding ISP
liability).
258. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1372-73, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
259. See id. at 1375.
260. See id. at 1368.
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quired to block access to that material.26  Under OCILLA, RTC could
have pursued an injunction against Netcom, specifically requesting the
removal of the infringing material, but monetary damages would likely
not have been awarded.262
OCILLA protects the interests of all affected parties by balancing the
remedies available to copyright owners and the responsibilities of ISPs.
263
ISPs that follow the conditions set forth in the Act will be exempt from
monetary damages arising from the infringing activities of subscribers.26
Copyright owners are able to expediently block access to the allegedly
infringing material by notifying the ISP of the potential misuse of the
copyrighted materialt.26  These provisions allow the Internet to keep de-
veloping as a communications tool and to increase the amount of infor-
mation available to the public.
2 66
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet has developed into a global communications tool used by
millions of people. This resource allows unparalleled amounts of infor-
mation to be transmitted, without regulation or censorship, for educa-
tional, business, and entertainment purposes. With this freedom has
come the price of electronic copyright infringement. The government
has endeavored to keep up with the technological advances, but courts
have inconsistently applied existing copyright laws to claims of liability
against ISPs. The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act is the best course of action to provide reasonable liability standards
that equitably balance the interests of copyright owners in protecting the
value of their works, the responsibilities of ISPs in providing such serv-
ices, and society's interest in the free flow of information.
261. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1999). In order to apply
OCILLA's regulations to Netcom, it must also be assumed that Netcom had a designated
agent to receive notifications of alleged infringements and that RTC's notice was ade-
quate. See id. § 512(c)(2)-(3).
262. See id. § 512(a) (providing that an ISP "shall not be liable for monetary relief, or
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief" if the ISP met
the stated requirements); see also id. § 5120) (providing for injunctive relief with regard to
on-line copyright infringement).
263. See supra Part IV.B (discussing why OCILLA adequately protects the interests of
ISPs, copyright owners, and the public).
264. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1).
265. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
266. Cf Gilsdorf, supra note 5, at 657 (concluding that legislation clarifying copyright
law would support the use and expansion of the Internet).
1276 [Vol. 48:1237
